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Feminine anger is a frequent and intriguing element in Mairie de France’s 
Lais. While some of this anger is of a stereotypical nature, such as that of 
the rebuffed queen in “Lanval” ( “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned”), 
in other cases it is the more justifiable anger of the malmariée, as presented 
by Marie from a unique, that is, feminine, perspective. As the unhappy lady 
in “Yonec” rants passionately about her husband:
Quant il dit estre baptiziez,
Si fu al flum d’enfern plungiez:
Dur sunt li nerf, dures les veines,
Que de vif sane sunt tûtes pleines.
[When he was supposed to be baptized,
He was plunged into the river of hell:
His nerves aie hard, his veins Me hard,
All filled with living blood.] (vv. 87-90)1
The lady’s lamentation in “Guigemar” is equally vitriolic, but aimed inter­
estingly (as I shall develop later) not at her husband but rather at the old 
priest who guards her: “Ceo doins[e] Deus que mal feu Tarde!” [“May God 
grant that he burn in hell!”] (v. 348), she cries. The potency of the outbursts 
of Marie’s characters and her apparent approval of them is surprising when
set against the background of twelfth-century life, in which, Penny Gold 
maintains, “the hierarchical vision was a mental habit deeply ingrained in 
medieval minds” (151). This vision, according to Gold, which is both gen­
der and class related, is what assured medieval women’s (and men’s) general 
acceptance of an oppressive social structure. Marie’s representation of these 
two women’s anger as justifiable seems doubly surprising when we consider 
her position as a writer for the court, dedicating her Lais as she did to a 
nobles reis (prologue, v. 43). Nonetheless, she was apparently unafraid to 
suggest that the hierarchical vision was not so deeply ingrained that it could 
suppress the m alm ariée’s (her version, at least) expression of the loneliness, 
frustration, boredom, and, above all, injustice she felt as a function of her 
inferior place in that hierarchy.
But perhaps even more surprising than Marie’s malmariées' expression 
of their dissatisfaction is their remedy for it; that is, their adultery. Marie is 
openly approving of the adulterous affairs of her malmariées, women abused 
and oppressed by the odious men they are forced to marry, and therefore 
apparently skeptical of the religious and cultural precepts of her day con­
cerning sexuality and marriage.2 Jaques De Caluwé concludes that in the 
Lais the more reference there is to God, the greater the immorality (114; 
qtd. by Brumlik 14). Marie frequently juxtaposes human love (often illicit) 
with divine love, and in doing so, I will argue, not only authors but also 
authorizes conduct that deviates from and is critical of Church and state 
sanctioned morality.
The figure of the malmariée is, of course, not original to Marie, but is 
found in the same period both in more popular works such as the fabliaux 
and in courtly lyric and romances such as those of Chrétien de Troyes, as 
Dafydd Evans points out in “Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, and the 
malmariée.'’ In Cligés, Chrétien presents as his malmariée the character of 
Fenice, who has been married against her will to an older man, the uncle of 
the man whom she really loves. Fenice’s reaction to her dilemma and her 
remedy for it, however, differ radically from those of Marie’s malmariées. 
In an uncompromising rejection of adultery (on moral grounds, she likes to 
assert; fear of scandal, however, seems to fuel her prudery as well), Fenice 
refuses to consummate her love affair with the handsome nephew and con­
demns the conduct of Iseut, that is, the queen’s willingness to sleep with two 
men at the same time to fulfil her illicit desire, as deceitful and trampish. In 
an even more uncompromising move, Fenice avoids consummating her mar­
riage to the uncle through her own brand of deceit and with the aid of an 
anti-love potion (a rare device within such a story line), on the grounds, she
reasons, that since she is in love with another man, she could never grant 
her husband her body in good conscience (nor in any eagerness, it would 
seem): “Qui a le cuer, cil a le cors” [“He who has the heart, has the body”] 
(v. 3123). Her “solution” to her predicament, therefore, in contrast to that 
of Marie’s malmariées, is a stubborn and ascetic state of virginity.
Even if, as Evans maintains, Chrétien does in the end express somewhat 
of an “enlightened male viewpoint” (170) on the subject of the malmariée 
(Fenice wins out in the end, as her troubles are allayed by her old hus­
band generously dying in order to make room for his nephew), Marie’s 
representation is much more radical in that the solutions she offers are 
counter-conventional, subversive to, rather than supportive of, standard 
morality. While Chrétien’s interest presumably lies in the maintenance of pa­
triarchal authority and the legitimacy of heirs, Marie’s lies without a doubt 
in the restoration of her m alm ariées’ happiness and well being. Marie’s 
role for the malmariée in resolving her own dilemma is active (self-fulfilling) 
rather than passive (self-denying), her action positive (accepting illicit love) 
rather than negative (rejecting marital consummation). In this way Marie’s 
representation of the malmariée stands apart from those of her male con­
temporaries and descendants (even the most “enlightened”).
I will focus for the most part on the two malmariées in the Lais of 
“Yonec” and “Guigemar,” referring more often to passages in “Yonec” where 
the malmariée holds a more central place in the story. Both have been mar­
ried off by their families against their wills to old, rich (and unattractive, one 
can surmise) men, presumably for the financial and social benefits with which 
such marriages would provide these families (see Flori 195-97). Laments the 
lady in “Yonec” :
Malëeit seient mi parent 
E li autre communalment 
Ki a cest gelus me donerent 
E a sun cors me marierent!
[A curse on my parents 
And all the others 
Who gave me to this jealous man 
And married me to his body!] (vv. 81-84)
She makes it clear that she has entered into this marriage against her will, 
and that it is strictly a union of bodies, not of minds or hearts. The motive 
of the husband, the instigator of the match, in marrying the lady is depicted 
as shallow and carnal, for it is pur sa beauté that the old man “loved” and
maxried her, even though, as Marie points out, she is also sage et curteise 
(v. 22). Both she and the lady in “Guigemar” have been locked up in towers 
because of their husbands’ irrational jealousy, which has filled them with the 
fear of being cuckolded and incited them to tyrannize their wives.
Both women as well have guards who act as eunuch figures, an old 
castrated priest in “Guigemar” and the widowed sister of the husband in 
“Yonec.” The sister presumably is meant to serve as a sort of companion 
to the lady, but she turns out to be not much of an accomplice in the 
lady’s capers, as it is she who reveals the presence of the lover, a magical 
bird that turns into a handsome knight, to the husband. The priest and 
the widow are also analogous in that they are both sexually powerless, the 
priest concretely so in that he “Les plus bas membres out perduz” [“has lost 
his nether members”] (v. 257), and the woman figuratively so in that she 
is both a widow and old, epithets which evoke the idea of sexual dormancy 
and frustration. Both figures could be seen as likely interested in thwarting 
any opportunities the young, beautiful ladies might have to fulfill their own 
desires. It is interesting to note that through these two characters, along 
with the old husbands (the husband in “Yonec” is assigned the adjectives 
“viel,” “antis,” and “Mut . . . trepassez en eage” all in the space of five lines 
[vv. 12-17]). Marie presents old age as a foil to youthful happiness, as a 
noxious agent that saps the youth and beauty from those who, like the ladies, 
are too long exposed to it. And so Marie sets up from the very beginning 
plots that will concern themselves with rebellion against the austerity and 
prudishness of old age and the conventions and oppressive religion that its 
leagues advocate.
It is important here, however, to point out the distinction that Marie 
makes between human codes of morality or religion (which these two undesir­
ables represent) and what she presents as a more authentic spirituality, with 
which many of her Lais (in particular “Yonec” and “Eliduc”) are saturated. 
She confines her critique to the former and offers the latter as a more deeply 
meaningful and fulfilling alternative. When the lady in “Yonec” laments her 
doleful situation, that of being locked up alone in her tower, she lists as her 
first grievance the fact that her husband will not allow her to go to church 
(v. 75). In making her wish for a handsome and brave knight to come and be 
her am i, despite the fact that she is a married woman, it is to God himself 
that she prays: “Deu, ki de tut ad poeste, /  II en face ma volente!” [“God, 
who has power over everything, /  Grant me my wish!”] (vv. 103-04). She 
apparently sees no conflict between her wish for a lover and her relationship 
with God. She throws in the stipulation, however, that this knight be so
“Beaus e curteis, [pruz] e vaillanz, /  Si que blamees n’en esteient” [“Hand­
some and courtly, brave and valiant, /  That they [the ladies who fall in love 
with such knights] could not be blamed”] (vv. 98-99). And if he is invisible 
(“Ne nul fors eles nes veeient” [“No one would see them except their ladies”] 
v. 100), all the better, as then the world would not be able to see, and so 
condemn, her transgression.
When the bird-knight flies in and gives his economical avowal of his love 
for the lady (this economy is standard in the Lais) and demands hers in 
return, she asks him, with seemingly odd timing, if he believes in God. He 
replies smoothly:
“Dame,” dit il, “vus dites bien.
Ne vodreie pur nule rien 
Que de mei i ait acheisun,
Mescreauncë u suspesçun.
Jeo crei mut bien al Creatur 
Que nus geta de la tristur,
U Adam nus mist, nostre pere,
Par le mors de la pumme amere.
[“Lady,” he said, “you speak wisely.
I would not want for anything
That there be accusation because of me,
Or mistrust or suspicion.
I believe strongly in the Creator,
Who delivered us from the grief
Into which Adam, our father, placed us
Through the bite of the bitter apple.] (vv. 145-52)3
The knight assures the lady of his love for God, which calms her and wins 
her over, again economically. His striking beauté, to which Marie refers four 
times, does not seem to impede the rapidity of the lady’s decision-making 
much either. In the lady’s appreciation of the knight’s physique, Marie 
perhaps allows her to play the role of the objectifying husband who loves her 
“pur sa beauté.” But only briefly, for in the end it is the knight’s catechism­
like recitation of his belief in God, and his oath that despite his rather sinister 
arrival he comes from the side of the divine rather than the diabolical, that 
convince the lady he is capable of loving her in a spiritual as well as a 
sexual manner. It is this profession of faith, given before both the literal 
and figurative “communion” of the lovers (assuming the lady’s body, the 
knight takes the host, immediately after which the couple consummate their 
coup de foudre) that will distinguish their union from common adulterous 
affairs and make it truly “blameless.”
But, interestingly, the lady’s distinction and subsequent justification of 
her adultery, the elaboration of which takes over one hundred lines, finds 
no sanction in twelfth-century theology. John Baldwin gives us the theo­
logical context of Marie’s stories by reminding us that in 1200 church doors 
throughout France were closed by papal interdict for nine months while King 
Philip dawdled in ending an adulterous affair (798).4 Aside from the polit­
ical power-play that this debate to some extent represents, it also serves to 
demonstrate the seriousness with which the Church took adultery, for with 
interdict the Pope claimed to hold in peril the fate of hundreds of thousands 
of souls.
Placing us squarely in this seemingly despotic theological atmosphere, 
Baldwin goes on to summarize and compare five discourses in sexual de­
sire from five very different cross-sections of society, beginning at the top 
of the severity scale with a group of sober theologians in the Augustinian 
tradition, and finishing at the bottom with an irreverent writer of fabliaux. 
Focussing first on the theologians, Baldwin gives their formulation of the 
four principal causes or rationale for marriage: 1) for the sake of offspring, 
2) rendering the marital debt between spouses, 3) avoiding fornication, and 
4) fulfilling one’s desires (803). The last two, it is well to remark, are sins, 
for wedding expressly and exclusively in order either to avoid extramarital 
or to enjoy intra-marital sexual relations does not pass marriage muster. 
Nowhere mentioned here is love; love is a justification neither for marriage 
not for sexual intercourse, which, having just barely justification within mar­
riage, has no excuse whatsoever outside of it. According to Augustine and 
his twelfth-century disciples, concupiscence, whether based on love or not, 
“recapitulated the primal disobedience and became the primordial venereal 
disease. Just as the first parents refused to obey God, so their genitals began 
to disobey rational and volitional commands” (801). The theologians re­
garded sexual intercourse as fundamentally sinful and so theoretically never 
truly blameless.
But one can easily question, and Baldwin does, the practical authority 
that the theologians held over the activities of the lay people, for at the same 
time that they are busy splitting hairs over whether sexual intercourse within 
a marriage is a mortal or just a venial sin, the characters in the fabliaux (and 
apparently the king himself) are guiltlessly and abundantly engaging in, and 
consummating, non-marital love affairs. In no way was Marie alone in her 
portrayal of unsanctioned love, although the writers of the fabliaux were 
much more brash and detail-oriented in their depiction of concupiscence, 
marital and otherwise. Baldwin demonstrates, as does Steven Nichols, that
the twelfth century was not an Augustinian monologue and that while the 
Church was very present in the lives of lay people, its prescriptions on love 
and sex were not necessarily heeded, as demonstrated particularly through 
the fabliaux and in courtly romance.
Yet while Maxie is not alone in her representation of illicit love, she is 
nevertheless exceptional in that she presents many of her stories as moral 
directives, contrary to the designs (or lack thereof) of the writers of the 
fabliaux in their happy disregard for Church-sanctioned morality (Baldwin 
806). In the prologue to her Lais, Marie says that such work as hers is an 
aid in the avoidance of vice, for the writer as well as the reader:
Ki de vice se volt defendre 
Estudier deit e entendre 
E grevos’ ovre comencier:
Pax [ceo] se puet plus esloignier 
E de grant dolur delivrer.
[He who wants to defend himself from vice 
Must study and understand 
And begin a weighty work:
Through this he cam better distance himself from vice 
And deliver himself from great sorrow.] (vv. 23-27)
She puts conventional morality into juxtaposition with the “morality” demon­
strated in her Lais, and tries to reveal, particularly through the malmariees, 
the debilitating injustice of the former and the healing justice of the latter. 
In both stories, the ladies are married against their wills to husbands who 
represent the antithesis of the worthy knight-lover, “beaus e curteis, pruz e 
vaillanz.” These marriages are not based in love but rather upon the need 
to produce heirs and to make profitable mergers of territories (interestingly 
the first two and only sinless causes of marriage according to the theolo­
gians). There can be no mistaking where Maxie’s sentiments lie and which 
side she wishes her readers to take. Her depiction of adultery in her Lais is 
not in the interest of irreverence, as it is for the writers of the fabliaux, not 
in doing away with morality itself; rather, it is in the interest of correcting 
that morality and making it more harmonious with human nature, desires 
and emotions. Marie offers a new morality that nourishes rather than re­
presses human nature, making it less a state to be reviled and repressed, as 
theologians see it, than one to be embraced and nurtured.
It should be noted, however, that the approval of adultery that Marie 
demonstrates in these two Lais does not necessarily extend to the others. 
In “Bisclavret,” the unfaithful wife has her nose bitten off by her offended
werewolf-husband.5 And in “Equitan” she is boiled alive (along with her 
lover, it is well to remember) for her transgression. The difference between 
the infidelities of these ladies and those of the malmariées lies in that those of 
the former are not incited by any mistreatment on the part of the husbands, 
but rather by the treachery of the wives themselves (although the husband 
in “Bisclavret” does neglect to tell her before she takes her vows that he is a 
werewolf). Adultery is only permitted to those (such as the malm ariées) who 
have suffered injustice and to those (such as the bird-knight) whose charac­
ters demonstrate them worthy of love on such a high order as to transcend 
such conventions as the marriage ceremony. Jeanne Lods concludes that in 
Marie de France, “la seule morale de l’amour est l’harmonie des couples; les 
amours valent ce que valent les êtres qui les éprouvent” (xxiv). Morality, 
Marie demonstrates, is not fixed but depends on the situations and on the 
individual; the same act that is justifiable for the ladies in “Guigemar” and 
“Yonec” is not so for the wives in “Bisclavret” and “Equitan.” In this way, 
Marie introduces in her Lais a notion of relativity and individuality that is 
rather uncharacteristic of her time and that calls into question some of its 
rigid universals.
In her essay on “Yonec,” Denise Despres links Marie’s writings with the 
blossoming in the late twelfth century of feminine mysticism and its notions 
of individual and highly personal spirituality. She sees the lady’s interlude 
with the bird-knight as a “spiritual search for wholeness” (28) analogous to 
the mystics’ often sexually depicted union with the divinity. She likens the 
appearance of the knight to a mystic vision that only transpires when its 
recipient is so spiritually bereft that she is open and receptive to even the 
fantastic (the bird-knight tells the lady “Mes ne poeie a vus venir /  Ne fors 
de mun païs eissir, /  Si vus ne me eüssez requis” [“But I could not have 
come to you /  Nor left my country, /  If you had not requested me”]) vv. 
131-33). Despres argues that, as with the mystics, although nothing changes 
materially for the lady, she is nevertheless spiritually transformed by her love 
for the knight. She learns, through this love, in the ascetic tradition of the 
mystics, to embrace her suffering at the hand of her husband and to use it 
as a means to her spiritual growth (36). Her beauty is restored, and she is 
able to live in happiness even after the death of her lover.
While I support Despres’s reading of “Yonec” in its recognition of the 
spiritual healing and growth represented within, I would nevertheless argue 
that in no way does Marie ignore the physical in her resolution; she trans­
forms not just the lady’s emotional state but her material state as well. 
Marie is much too practical, as Joan Brumlik also argues (7), her fantasy
too bound up in reality, to disregard her mahnariees' physical and material 
troubles. As a woman in the twelfth century, Marie must have been aware 
of the consequences of such a transgression in her social milieu.6
Marie’s Lais contain enough reality to convince the reader of the poten­
tial gravity of the discovery of moral transgression, and Marie’s characters 
are never so far removed from their realities as to make them careless (Brum- 
lik 8). In “Yonec” Marie spares the lady from the repercussions of her 
adultery by making the husband lose his memory of what his sister had 
told him about the bird-knight. The husband, also apparently forgetting his 
prior jealousy, no longer keeps the lady locked up in her tower but rather 
lets her free, we assume, to see her family and friends, thus allowing her to 
dispel the oppressive loneliness she had felt in the tower. Also the lady’s 
affair with the fairy-tale knight results in her very real pregnancy and the 
birth of her son Yonec. He serves as a concrete reminder to her of her love 
for his father and as a this-worldly comfort to her. Finally, Marie includes 
in her plot the most human and this-worldly of all reactions to injustice, 
revenge. In the end, Yonec avenges his step-father’s cruelty and the murder 
of his father by killing him. Similarly, in “Guigemar” the lady’s escape from 
the tower to Guigemar’s land represents even more of a physical escape from 
oppression. Marie unlocks the door of the lady’s chamber to allow her to 
escape to the magic boat, which transports her to her lover’s land and to a 
happier existence.
I would argue, then, that Marie’s is not a “turn-the-other-cheek” moral­
ity, a passive acceptance of injustice, unlike that commonly prescribed for 
oppressed women of her day. When a real-life malmariee, Ermengarde, 
duchess of Brittany, sought the help of Robert of Abrissel in having her un­
happy marriage dissolved, even this procurator mulierum  counseled her to 
resign herself to her lot, to be a good wife and mother, and, above all, to 
pray (Smith 183). In Marie’s Lais, transgressors of her morality (and not 
necessarily of conventional morality) are punished for their acts of injustice, 
often with the result that the victims of the evil deeds are able to live more 
freely and happily. In “Yonec,” this formula is somewhat altered in that the 
lady spontaneously dies when her victimizer, her husband, is killed by her 
son. Yet I would maintain that Marie is nevertheless faithful to the doctrine 
of compensation for the victim, for in this euthanasia Marie seems to be 
preserving the lady from the ascetic widowhood and old age represented by 
the husband’s sister, instead delivering her immediately to a reunion with 
the knight in the other world.
While “Guigemar,” with the reunion of the two lovers, ends on a more 
traditionally happy note them “Yonec,” interestingly enough, as Brumlik 
points out, no mention of marriage is ever made (8). We might assume that 
marriage is out of the question considering the marital status of the lady; 
but when we consider Marie’s record of abuse of other moral conventions, 
such a move as formally uniting the two despite the husband does not seem 
implausible. Marie also might have killed off the pesky husband, as she does 
in “Milun,” so as to allow the lovers to marry legitimately. But she exercises 
neither of these authorial rights, even though we are led to believe that 
Guigemar and the lady will remain together. I would propose, then, that in 
this case Marie rejects marriage as unnecessary meddling in a happiness that 
needs no institutional intervention, no doctoring from the author or from 
society. As Brumlik points out, Marie’s objective in her Lais is not always 
to re-integrate her alienated characters back into society, as demonstrated 
in particular by the final flight of the two lovers in “Lanval” (8). But in 
“Guigemar” she does not furnish the hero and his lady with an escape to 
Avalon; it seems rather that they will stay together in the “real” (if fictional) 
world (as will, we must assume, the lady’s husband). And so with this “this- 
worldly” ending in particular, Marie proposes her brand of morality not 
simply as something to be realized in the next world but as workable in 
this one.
Marie’s refusal in “Yonec” and “Guigemar” to accept separate morali­
ties for reality and fantasy, this world and the next, indicates also a refusal 
to accept the separation of mind and body that twelfth-century theology 
espoused. This mind/body separation served as a basis for another most 
important distinction, that between man and woman (Bloch 23-24). Mind, 
the superior of the two elements, equalled other-worldly, spiritual, rational, 
man; while body equalled this-worldly, carnal, irrational, woman. But Marie 
constantly confounds the real and the fantastic, the body and the imagina­
tion (the mind), both in her Lais and within the souls of her characters. The 
lady in “Yonec” is human and yet able to use the power of her imagination 
to summon the bird-knight; the bird-knight is divine yet human enough to 
impregnate the lady. The lady in “Guigemar” is fantastic yet human enough 
to be integrated into courtly life; Guigemar is human yet finds solutions to 
his troubles in the fantastic. Many of Marie’s characters, whether male or 
female, contain both worldly and other-worldly elements, and it is exactly 
this internal duality in each that allows the union of each couple and the 
fulfillment of the love within it. Marie thus merges human, sexual love with 
divine, spiritual love, and, in doing so, renders the body/mind dichotomy
inoperative. In representing human love as a form of or precursor to divine 
love, Marie refutes the theologians’ precept that that which is corporeal, 
sensual, concupiscent (i.e., woman) is inherently evil.
In opposition to the somewhat radical flavor that I am ascribing to 
Marie’s writings, Charles Brucker, in the introduction to his edition of 
Marie’s F ables, argues that Marie is essentially conservative in her social 
and political outlook and so conceives of a justice “dont la première fonction 
est de restaurer l’harmonie du corps social par le compromis et la concili­
ation, et non pas d’assigner les responsabilités et de châtier les coupables” 
(xxvi). But it is well to note that in half of Marie’s Lais, the villainous or the 
foolish get their just desserts for their misdeeds, by way of either humiliation 
or death. And even in the Fables her frequent condemnation of the rulers 
or the rich who misuse their power7 attests to her antipathy toward the ac­
cepted social order. If Marie is conservative, her “conservatism” lies in her 
desire to recover from society a basic justice that transcends that artificial (if 
necessary) construct, whether that justice be in favor of the unappreciated 
seign eu r, the falsely-accused vilein  (peasant), the browbeaten husband, or 
the tyrannized wife. Marie sees fools and tyrants in all social classes and 
among both sexes. Her Lais do not offer a standard morality, a set rule 
for behaviour, for her treatment of a particular transgression is too varied 
for us to arrive at a single “moral of the story.” Marie has no formula for 
her morality — hers is what Lods calls a m orale indécise  (xxvi). She sides 
with him (or more often with her) who has been done wrong according to an 
organic justice that depends on the natural rather than on the institutional.
But in the end, as Lods notes, there seems to be more psychology than 
morality in Marie’s Lais (xxvi). Her m alm ariées react to assaults upon their 
emotional well-being, using both their minds (their imaginations) and their 
bodies to free themselves. Through her portraits of the m alm ariée, Marie 
states her case for the profundity of women’s emotional and spiritual ca­
pacities, capacities that had always been denied or reduced to predictable 
categories. In religious matters, her women demonstrate surprising indepen­
dence of mind, in that by looking inward (rather than exclusively outward 
toward society) they design a “morality” that is conducive rather than de­
structive to their natures and their happiness and that is consequently often 
at odds with the morality of their societies. These ladies’ anger is por­
trayed as a natural, human reaction to injustice and not the predictable 
ranting of the universal woman described in theological and other discourses 
of the time.8 They are three- rather than two-dimensional, neither angels 
nor devils, virgins (God knows) nor whores. Marie’s m alm ariées cannot be
submitted to that process of appraisal that Howard Bloch says has “reduced 
women to the status of a category . . . [and] whose function was . . . the 
division of women from history by the annihilation of the identity of the 
individual” (196-97). But ultimately it is for men as well as for women, 
for all individuals, that Marie renders personal feelings such as loneliness, 
alienation, frustration, and injustice significant and so legitimizes discontent 
and action taken to allay these feelings. In a highly authoritarian and de­
personalized society, Marie proposes that personal happiness and well-being 
matter. She unlocks the doors to the ebony towers and lets the m alm ariées, 
both the literal and the figurative, escape and run down to the sea.
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NOTES
1 All such references to Marie’s work are from Ewert. The English translations are 
mine, but I have used the Hanning and Ferrante translation as a reference.
2 In Marie’s Lais, justice generally prevails with punishment duly accorded to the 
wicked and compensation or revenge to the good. In the two Lais already mentioned, as 
well as in “Laustic,” “Chevrefoil,” and “Milun,” the moral of the story turns in favour 
of the married lady who loves another man, indicating that Marie’s definitions of “good” 
and “wicked” are not necessarily dictated by conventional morality.
3 Here it is interesting to note that if we were not already quite sure that the writer 
of these lais was a woman, this acquittal of Eve at the expense of her husband might serve 
to convince us!
4 The issue of the king’s infidelities is obviously more complicated than suggested 
here, but only the above points serve the present argument.
® According to Shulamith Shahar, under Frederick II of Sicily (1194-1250), the 
penalty for adultery for a woman (and not a man) was having her nose cut off (18).
® Shahar argues that, although most likely no one was cutting off noses in France 
around 1200, punishment for a woman was nevertheless often more severe than for her 
male partner, as the legitimacy of inheritance had to be safeguarded (107).
7 See fables 2, 4, and 6 (54, 66, 70).
® Marie illustrates this conception of “woman” as a two-dimensional entity by giving 
Guigemar trouble in recognizing the love of his life when she appears in Meriaduc’s court. 
Can’t be her, he shrugs, “Femmes se resemblent asez” [“Women all look quite alike”] (v. 
779). Intelligence never does appear on Marie’s list of knightly virtues.
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